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ABSTRACT 
 
Strategic alliances are an important feature of the aerospace industry and there have 
been many studies that have sought to evaluate their performance. Most have taken a 
policy perspective exploring the economic and political benefits claimed for 
collaboration of this type. The perspective is a reflection of the political origins of 
many aerospace alliances. This study seeks to evaluate, from a managerial 
perspective, one of the newer alliances established on a strictly commercial basis,. It 
focuses on BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH, one of a small number of truly European 
alliances. The study concludes that although Rolls-Royce bought out its German 
partner after a decade of operation, the alliance was a success. The two engines 
developed by the alliance over this period were a technical success, overall sales were 
well on target and the alliance was about to break even. In addition, the study 
concludes that the alliance formed a key element in Rolls-Royce‟s successful strategy 
to extend its product portfolio, a strategy that elevated the company to second place in 
the global aero engine market. 
 
 
Keywords: Aerospace; Competitive Strategy; Strategic Alliances; Performance.
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STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES IN THE 
EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY: THE CASE OF BMW ROLLS-
ROYCE GmbH 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Cross border collaboration through international joint ventures has become 
increasingly common (Dussauge and Garrette, 1999), forming an intermediate step 
between markets and hierarchies (Gomes-Casseres, 1996) as a means of achieving 
economic coordination. Collaboration has particularly been a feature of high 
technology industries and several studies (Hartley and Martin, 1990; Hegert and 
Morris, 1988; Glaister and Buckley, 1994) have shown that aerospace is an industry 
with one of the highest rates of international joint venture formation. Such ventures 
have a long history in aerospace, having been a feature of the industry in Europe since 
the 1960s. 
 
Although the aircraft manufacuring sector of the aerospace industry is home to some 
of the best known examples of aerospace collaboration such as Airbus Industrie, 
Panavia and Eurofighter, joint ventures are also widespread in the aero engine sector. 
Unlike their counterparts in the aircraft manufacturing sector, most are commercial 
joint ventures, established by the engine manufacturers themselves rather than at the 
behest of governments. Among the better known ones are CFM-International, a joint 
venture between General Electric of the US and France‟s SNECMA, and International 
Aero Engines a joint venture between Pratt and Whitney of the US, Britain‟s Rolls-
Royce, MTU of  Germany and a Japanese consortium. More recently the two leading 
US engine makers have together formed a joint venture to develop a new engine for 
the new high capacity Airbus A380. As well as these alliances that produce engines 
for the civil airliner market are ones set up to produce smaller commercial engines. In 
this category comes Williams-Rolls, a joint venture between Williams International of 
the US and Rolls-Royce, that produces the FJ44 engine for small business jets, and  
until recently, BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH, a joint venture set up to produce the BR700 
engine, for large business jets and regional airliners. 
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BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH was established on 1
st
 July 1990 as a joint venture between 
the German car maker BMW AG (50.5%) and Britain‟s Rolls-Royce (49.5%). The 
purpose of the joint venture was to develop a new engine core, the BR700, that would 
provide the basis of a family of engines covering the 12,000-14,000lbs thrust market 
segment and designed to replace Rolls-Royce‟s successful Tay engine. From its 
inception, BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH was an unusual joint venture.  
 
Firstly BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH is the only aerospace alliance with a partner drawn 
from outside the aerospace industry.  Although BMW began life as a manufacturer of 
aero engines (Monnich, 1991) and was Germany‟s leading producer of jet engines in 
World War 2 (Kay, 1993), it severed its links with aerospace in the 1960s and by 1990 
its activities were confined to the automotive industry. While there have been other 
instances of firms using joint ventures to gain market entry, they have always had 
existing aerospace interests.   Secondly, BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH was a separate 
entity, with a higher degree of  independence from its parents than other joint 
ventures.  The partners in CFM-International, General Electric of the US and France‟s 
Snecma, for instance, are each responsible for assembling engines produced by the 
joint venture, while BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH established its own purpose-built 
manufacturing and assembly facilities at Dahlewitz near Berlin.  This led Dussauge 
and Garrette (1995) in a taxonomy of collaborative agreements, to classify BMW 
Rolls-Royce GmbH in a different category from other engine joint ventures, termed 
‟Business-based joint ventures‟. Finally, BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH is unusual in that 
it is the only commercial aero engine joint ventures where both of the partners are 
European. All the others have been transatlantic alliances, with the partners drawn 
from both sides of the atlantic. BMW Rolls-Royce is unique in being an entirely 
European joint venture, created by European companies as a commercial venture, 
without any government  involvement. This factor alone makes it worthy of study.  
 
This paper reports on a study that aims to evaluate this example of European 
collaboration in the aerospace industry. Unlike other studies of aerospace strategic 
alliances, this study takes a strategic perspective rather than a policy perspective, 
evaluating performance in terms of the contribution of the joint venture to the long 
term aims of the partners and the specific objectives identified for the joint venture 
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itself. It includes an examination of the part played by each of the partners.  This 
provides an opportunity to examine the role of this strategic alliance in helping the 
partner organisations implement their competitive strategies.  This in turn helps to 
explain the reasons behind  the announcement in November 1999 that Rolls-Royce 
was to buy out BMW‟s stake effectively ending ten years of joint venture operation, 
although the joint venture continues to function as Rolls-Royce Deutschland. 
 
 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The scale of the collaborative activity in the aerospace industry has resulted in it being 
the focus of a number of research studies. Many of these have sought to evaluate the 
performance of international joint ventures in aerospace. However as Dussauge and 
Garrette (1993) point out, these studies have generally taken an economic or political 
perspective, rather than a managerial perspective. 
 
Studies that have been primarily economic (Hartley, 1983; Hartley, 1988; Mowery, 
1988; Martin and Hartley, 1991; Hartley and Martin, 1993; Martin and Hartley, 1995) 
have sought to evaluate public policy in terms of the efficient allocation of resources. 
Although some of the studies have included joint ventures covering civil aerospace, 
the focus has generally been on military programmes especially those described by 
Muller (1995, p176) as, „alliances imposed by governments‟, rather than commercial 
joint ventures. Evaluation focussed upon economic efficiency, with performance 
judged in terms of cost savings, increases in output and the level of exports. The 
studies have generally taken the form of quantitative studies and their findings have 
pointed to increased market share for European collaborative programmes but at the 
cost of longer development times (Martin and Hartley, 1991) and higher production 
costs (Martin and Hartley, 1995) compared to independent national programmes. 
 
Alongside studies that have sought to make an economic evaluation, have been those 
taking a political perspective (Hayward, 1976; Mowery, 1987; Thornton, 1996; 
Muller, 1995; McGuire, 1997). Though diverse in their aims, they too have generally 
sought to evaluate policies. Among the themes covered have been economic 
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integration, trade policy, the role of the state and industrial/competition policy. Again 
the focus has been less on the operation of individual joint ventures and more on the 
impact upon policy. They have endeavoured to evaluate policy decisions, but from a 
political rather than an economic perspective. 
 
In contrast to the substantial number of studies that have concentrated on 
economic/political aspects of joint ventures there have been only a very small number 
(Dussauge and Garrette, 1993;  Dussauge and Garrette, 1994; Dussauge and Garrette, 
1995) that have sought to evaluate collaborative arrangements from a strategic  
management perspective. This is probably a reflection of the political origins of many 
of the older alliances. Commercial joint ventures are a more recent phenomenon, so 
there are fewer of them and consequently they have been subject to less scrutiny. The 
few studies that have been undertaken link commercial success to the organisational 
structures adopted.  
 
This study endeavours to assist in redressing this imbalance in particular the lack of 
studies that have taken a strategic management perspective. It is based on an 
evaluation of one of the newer forms of alliance, namely a commercial, rather than  a 
politically inspired, joint venture. It is also one of a comparatively small number of 
studies to be based on a single detailed case study rather than a quantitative study 
covering a large number of different programmes.  
 
 
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE JOINT VENTURE 
 
Aims and Objectives 
Whereas economic and political evaluations of joint ventures can take a broad 
perspective exploring issues such as allocative efficiency, evaluations from a strategic 
management perspective need to be more focussed. Where commercial joint ventures 
such as BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH are concerned, commercial aims provide the 
primary focus for the joint venture‟s activities. Wider economic and political 
considerations are inevitably of less concern to partners in commercial joint ventures. 
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In the case of BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH, the principal commercial aim was to 
establish the joint venture as a leading European manufacturer of aero engines within 
two specific segments of the aero engine market, namely large corporate jets and 
regional airliners. It was also hoped to secure some re-engining applications on older 
jets. 
 
Take in Table I 
 
A simple comparison of BMW Rolls-Royce‟s turnover after almost a decade of 
operation, with other European engine makers indicates that this objective was 
achieved. Table I shows that by 1999 when Rolls-Royce took over the joint venture, 
BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH had become a major European aero engine manufacturer. 
In the space of ten years it had grown into a business with a turnover of nearly three-
quarters of a billion dollars. It had overtaken France‟s Turbomeca, a long established 
manufacturer of small aero engines. The joint venture‟s progress  was all the more 
impressive when one considers that some of its rivals, such as SNECMA, Volvo 
Flygmotor and Fiat Avio manufactured aerospace components as well as engines. A 
measure of the joint venture‟s international success can be gauged by the fact that 
BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH became one of the Top 100 Aerospace companies in the 
world in 1998, in 75
th
 position measured by turnover, rising in the following year to 
50
th
 place. Furthermore BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH had only delivered its first engine 
three years earlier in 1996. 
 
Thus by the end of the 1990s, the principal strategic aim of the joint venture had been 
achieved. This was a considerable achievement bearing in mind that the partners 
anticipated a relatively slow build-up to full production given the long term nature of 
the aerospace  industry. However evaluating a joint venture from a strategic 
management perspective also demands that some of the more specific objectives be 
considered. 
 
Production 
The joint venture‟s aim of becoming one of Europe‟s leading manufacturers of aero 
engines for civil aircraft was to be achieved by means of a new generation of engines 
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based around the development of a new engine core. The BR700 core engine was 
formally launched on 31
st
 March 1991. It drew heavily on Rolls-Royce‟s other engine 
programmes (Rupertson, 1998). The new core was run successfully for the first time 
in August 1993. 
 
Take in Figure 1 
 
The entry of the BR710 engine into service in late 1996 marked the transition of 
BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH from a company that developed aero engines to one that 
manufactured them. As figure 1 shows, production built up rapidly. Output in 1997 
was 100 engines, all BR710 engines for Gulfstream V corporate jets. The following 
year in 1998, production of engines for the Global Express corporate jet commenced. 
In 1999 the larger BR715 engine went into production and entered service on the 
Boeing 717-200 regional jet. These developments reflected a rapid build up in 
production. Figure 1 shows that by 1999 production had almost doubled to 200 
engines per year. In the same year the joint venture moved up to three shift operation. 
Thus by 1999 the objective of developing a new engine core that could be used as the 
basis of a family of new engines had been achieved, and two engines, the 14,000lbs 
thrust BR710 and the 18,000lbs thrust BR715, had been designed, developed, 
certificated and put into service. 
 
Sales 
In terms of sales, BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH also performed well. By late 1999, nearly 
ten years after the joint venture was first announced, BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH had 
orders for 1,000 engines. This compares with projected sales of 3,000 for the period 
1996-2010. The first engine in the BR700 series, the 14,000lbs thrust BR710 was 
launched in 1992 . Production commenced in1996 and this was quickly reflected in 
the joint venture's turnover. As table II shows turnover increased  tenfold in the four 
years between 1995 and 1999. Hence BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH had achieved one 
third of its targeted sales within a comparatively short space of time and was well on 
target to achieve the sales total planned for 2010. 
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Take in Table II 
 
Not only was the level of total engine orders strong, the joint venture had by 1999 
notched up these sales on four different aircraft applications. These included the 
Gulfstream V corporate jet, the Global Express corporate jet, the Boeing 717-200 
(formerly designated the MD-95) 100 seat regional airliner and the British Aerospace 
Nimrod 2000 maritime patrol aircraft. In addition, all four of these applications were 
single sourced. That is to say in each instance the BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH engine 
was the only one used on that airframe. There was no rival engine that customers 
could specify. Although single sourcing is more likely to occur with corporate jet and 
regional airliner applications (Bonaccorsi and Giuri, 2000) because customers do not 
have large aircraft fleets that justify multiple sourcing, nonetheless this was 
impressive. It was a measure of the airframe manufacturers confidence in the new 
engine and also pointed to the prospect of greater profitability for the BR700 series 
engine because of the absence of competition. 
 
While the joint venture proved successful in terms of its technical ability to develop 
new engines, and the overall level of sales was well on target by the late 1990s, the 
penetration of specific market segments did not turn out as planned when the joint 
venture was established in 1990.   
 
Corporate jets 
The joint venture‟s business plan envisaged sales of 3000 engines over the period 
1996-2010. Having achieved orders for 1000 engines by 1999, BMW Rolls-Royce 
GmbH was well on target. However the mix of engines envisaged that the 3000 
engines would be split in favour of the regional jet market with only 700 engines 
being sold in the corporate jet market. In reality the split was the other way round with 
the corporate jet sector taking two-thirds of BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH‟s sales. This 
pattern reflected greater than expected success in the corporate jet sector and 
disappointing results in the regional jet market. BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH‟s success 
in corporate jets came early. Having the BR710 engine selected by both of the 
manufacturers of a new generation of ultra-long range, „heavy iron‟ (Phillips, Phillips 
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and Phillips, 1994) corporate jets meant that the joint venture dominated this market 
segment.  
 
The Re-engining market 
The second market that the joint venture planned to target when it was formed in 1990 
was the re-engining market. This was a market in which Rolls-Royce‟s Tay engine 
had enjoyed considerable success. As new Stage 3 noise regulations came into 
operation in the late 1980s operators of first generation short haul airliners such as the 
Boeing 727 and the BAC1-11 found that re-equiping these aircraft with Rolls-Royce‟s 
Tay engine was a cost effective solution to the problem of noise compliance. Re-
engining with the Tay engine offered the twin benefits of a proven engine with which 
operators were already familiar, combined with the latest developments in technology 
such as Rolls-Royce‟s wide chord fan (Kinnear, 1986). Since the BR710 was 
technically more advanced than the Tay engine it was hoped that operators would opt 
for the new engine. Although a number of re-engining applications were proposed, 
including a recent proposal  to re-engine the MD-80 twin jet with the BR715 engine 
(Kingsley-Jones, 2001b), no commercial applications had been forthcoming by the 
time Rolls-Royce bought out BMW's stake at the end of 1999. Instead most aircraft 
operators opted instead for „hushkits‟ that made existing engines noise compliant.  
 
However BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH did achieve one re-engining success and it came 
from an unlikely source, the defence sector. When in 1997 Britain‟s Ministry of 
Defence decided to upgrade the Royal Navy‟s maritime patrol aircraft, the Nimrod, 
BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH won an order for 88 BR710 engines (BMW, 1998, p91) as 
part of a re-engining programme.  
 
The Regional Jet market 
By the time Rolls-Royce came to buy out BMW‟s share in November 1999, the joint 
venture had enjoyed only limited success in the regional jet market. When the joint 
venture was founded in 1990 there were strong signs of the potential of the regional 
airliner market.  Regional airline traffic in the US had grown fourfold during the 
1980s in the aftermath of de-regulation (Hanlon, 1996).  A particular feature of the 
growth was the spread of alliances and partnerships between major US airlines and 
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smaller regional airlines.  These alliances, some of which took the form of franchising 
arrangements, were designed to consolidate traffic feed and extend networks.  By 
1990 a similar trend was beginning in Europe with regional airlines expanding more 
rapidly than the airline industry as a whole. However, the regional airliner market was 
still dominated, as figure 2 makes plain, by more fuel efficient if less comfortable 
small turboprop powered aircraft. This domination reflected the fact that the 30-50 
seat segment of the market was almost exclusively the preserve of turboprop aircraft. 
What is more a number new turboprop aircraft appeared in the 1980s powered by new 
turboprop engines that gave a marked improvement in performance (Bonaccorsi and 
Giuri, 2000). A number of jet powered regional airliners in the 100 seat market 
segment had been proposed including Daimler-Benz Aerospace's  Regioliner, the 
Aerospatiale/Alenia AI(R) 70 and the Fokker 70. All were European offerings and 
there were a number of Asian proposals at this time as well. Under the circumstances 
the prospects for 100 seat regional jets looked promising and the BR715 engine was 
targeted at this market segment. 
 
Take in Figure 2 
 
During the 1990s, the regional aircraft market underwent what Bonaccorsi and Giuri, 
(2000, p857) describe as a „radical change‟. The catalyst for this change was 
Bombardier‟s introduction of a 50 seat regional jet the CRJ100/200, a derivative of 
the company‟s successful Challenger 601 business jet originally designed by Bill Lear 
(Phillips, Phillips and Phillips, 1994, p124) the originator of the Learjet. Bombardier's 
new regional jet was followed  by similar offerings from Embraer and Fairchild-
Dornier. Like Bombardier‟s regional jet they too were derivatives of existing models.  
Both were derivatives not of business jets but turboprop powered regional airliners. 
All three designs, while powered by turbofan engines, because of their small size, 
utilized engines much smaller than those offered by BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH. Both 
the CRJ100/200 and the Embraer ERJ 145 proved highly popular. By the end of the 
1990s Bombardier had orders for 730 CRJ100/200s, of which 417 were in service and 
Embraer had orders for 737  ERJ 145s  of which 286 were in service (Flight 
International,2000b). As figure 2 shows the regional airliner market shifted 
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dramatically from turboprop to turbofan powered aircraft, causing what many 
described as a „rush for jets‟. 
 
Meanwhile the larger 100 seat regional airliner designs proposed in the late 1980s 
failed to materialize. One by one the projects were cancelled. Then in 1996  Fokker, 
the aircraft manufacturer that had pioneered the  regional jet with its F28 back in the 
1970s and been a major customer for the BR700‟s predecessor, the Rolls-Royce Tay 
engine, ceased trading. At this point the market for engines of the BR715's thrust 
rating looked bleak. BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH found its claim to the regional jet 
market squeezed from three directions, despite the fact that the overall market grew 
rapidly in the 1990s. The demise of most of the 100 seat regional jet designs proposed 
in the late 1980s, combined with the departure of Fokker, one of Rolls-Royce‟s 
biggest customers for the Tay engine, deprived the joint venture of  a number of 
potential airframe applications. At the same time the market for small turbofan 
engines expanded dramatically as new 50 seat regional jets appeared. One of the main 
beneficiaries was General Electric with its CF34 engine. Having established a firm 
bridgehead, the manufacturers of these small regional jets were then able to trade up 
and enter the 70 seat market segment. Bombardier's  CRJ700 model which was 
launched in the late 1990s, was a stretched version of  its earlier CRJ100/200 design. 
Fairchild Dornier and Embraer came up with entirely new designs. As General 
Electric developed more powerful versions of the CF34 engine, manufacturers like 
Bombardier opted for manufacturers they knew and worked with previously. 
Unfortunately up-rating engines tends to be a more attractive proposition than de-
rating them, so that BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH effectively missed out on the „rush to 
jets‟ that occurred in the regional airliner market in the 1990s. 
 
Take in Table III 
 
The joint venture was only able to achieve one regional jet application, the MD-95 
later re-designated as the Boeing 717. Although this was a single sourcing application, 
by the end of the 1990s sales of the Boeing 717 which entered service with AirTran 
Airways in September 1999 proved disappointing. Table III shows that by 2001 total 
sales of the Boeing 717 came to 150. By comparison Bombardier‟s CRJ700, which 
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had yet to enter service, had orders for 222 aircraft by May 2000 (Dixon, 2000). This 
was a reflection of the popularity of smaller jets. Reluctant to incur the cost of  a new 
variant and worried that the development of a second version would hit sales of its 
100 seat model, Boeing did not develop a 70 seat variant. As a result BMW Rolls-
Royce GmbH was effectively shut out of the market for regional jets in the 70 seat 
category. 
 
Competitors 
Three years after the establishment of BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH, MTU of Germany 
and SNECMA of France and their respective American partners came together to 
form a rival engine consortium. „Project Blue‟ (Pletschacher and Kanebo, 1993, p24) 
was announced to the world at the Paris air show in 1993. Like BMW Rolls-Royce 
GmbH, Project Blue aimed to develop an engine family in the 12,000-23,000lbs thrust 
range. The four companies felt that the potential of this market segment was too great 
to be left to BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH (Mecham, 1993, p49). However they planned 
to develop an engine towards the top of this thrust range first, since BMW Rolls-
Royce GmbH had initially focussed on the lower end. Unfortunately the partners were 
unable to agree on the detail of the engine specification and within a year the 
consortium  had collapsed. 
 
Unable to agree on the best path to develop a competitor engine that would rival 
BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH‟s offerings, members of the „Gang of Four‟ (Pletschacher 
and Kanebo, 1993, p24) who had set up Project Blue tried again. 
 
France‟s SNECMA joined forces with Pratt and Whitney‟s small engine subsidiary 
Pratt and Whitney of Canada. In April 1996 they announced plans to develop a new 
12,000-16,000lbs thrust engine, the SPW14, that would compete with the smaller of 
the two BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH engines, the BR710. The SPW14 was to be based 
on the core of SNECMA‟s M88 military engine. Although it won the technical 
evaluation for the AI(R)70 regional jet, the project was shelved. Plans for a stretched 
SPW14 were announced in March 1999, with the thrust rating extended to 20,000lbs 
thrust. Despite the fact that this expanded the number of potential applications, by the 
end of the 1990s the joint venture  remained stillborne as it lacked a launch airframe. 
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Meanwhile in 1997 Pratt and Whitney announced plans to go it alone in developing  a 
rival to the BR700, with the launch of an entirely new engine the PW6000 (Donaghue, 
1998). With a thrust rating of 15,000-20,000lbs, the PW6000 scored an early success 
when in September 1998 it was designated the launch engine for the new Airbus 
regional airliner, the 100 seat A318. However Pratt and Whitney was not able to 
secure single sourcing on the A318. CFM-International with a de-rated version of its 
highly successful CFM56 engine became an alternative supplier when Air France 
ordered 15 CFM56 powered A318s in July 1999 (Lewis, 1999). Nor was this Pratt and 
Whitney‟s only problem with the PW6000. Technical problems with the engine meant 
that instead of the projected entry into service date of the PW6000-powered A318 
being 2003, this had to be put back a year (Lewis, 2002). This was a most 
inauspicious start for a major new engine programme. 
 
The same could not be said of the fourth engine to rival BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH‟s 
BR700, General Electric‟s CF34 engine. This engine pre-dated BMW Rolls-Royce 
GmbH by some 20 years and at the time of the launch of the joint venture was not a 
competitor. The CF34 was a commercial derivative of the military TF34 engine 
developed by General Electric in the late 1960s to power the Fairchild-Republic A10 
Thunderbolt fighter-bomber. Much smaller than either of the BR700 engines, the 
commercial CF34 engine was developed from the military TF34 in the 1980s and 
found applications on medium-sized corporate jets. However in the late 1990s the 
CF34 emerged as a rival to the BR700 when General Electric successfully developed 
much more powerful versions, first of 13,000lbs thrust and then 18,000lbs thrust. It 
became a serious  competitor for the BR710 engine as the manufacturers of small 
regional jets developed larger 70-90 seat models. As the leading manufacturers of 
regional jets of this size, including Bombardier and Embraer, opted for the high thrust 
versions of General Electric‟s engine, the CF34 found a ready market and sales 
soared.  
 
COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES OF THE PARTNERS 
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Although one of the features of BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH is that it is was an equity 
joint venture and therefore independent of its parents, the evaluation of the 
performance of the joint venture has to take account of the partners and their motives 
in setting it up. Establishing BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH was a major step for both of 
the partner companies. It formed an important element in each company‟s  
competitive strategy. Hence evaluation of the joint venture needs to consider the 
contribution that it made to the competitive strategies of each partner.  
 
BMW AG 
 
At the time the joint venture was established in 1990, BMW was an independent 
specialist car manufacturer focused on a specific market niche – executive saloons 
(Noble, 1992). It was one of five smaller specialist car manufacturers in Europe 
(Womack, et. al., 1990) alongside Mercedes, Volvo, Saab and Jaguar.  Although in 
third place in terms of output among Germany‟s automotive manufacturers, behind 
Daimler-Benz, and VW, BMW was highly profitable. Positioned between the full 
range car manufacturers (Noble, 1992) and the craftsmen built output of the luxury 
saloon manufacturers (Kay, 1999), BMW successfully matched the organisation‟s 
distinctive capabilities - German engineering and technical expertise, to the market 
opportunities presented by high performance saloon cars.  In the process BMW had 
become a world leading, highly valued brand.  In Kay‟s (1999, p18) words “BMW 
proved to be one of the great success stories in modern business history”. 
 
BMW in 1990 differed markedly from most other car manufacturers.  Not only was it 
much more focussed in the sense that its products targeted a narrow market segment it 
was also much more focussed on car production, having undertaken little in the way 
of diversification.  This was in sharp contrast to its competitors, most of whom had 
non-car interests, particularly in the field of aerospace.  All the major American car 
producers, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler, had aerospace divisions.  Not only 
that, some extended their exposure to aerospace in the 1980s. General Motors 
purchased Hughes Electronics in 1985, in a move intended to reduce its dependence 
on cars (Hayward, 1994), and in the same year Chrysler sought to increase its 
diversification through the purchase of Gulfstream Aerospace (Phillips, Phillips and 
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Phillips, 1994). In Europe, Volvo, Saab and Fiat all had established aerospace 
divisions.  During the 1980s Daimler-Benz spent DM 8 billion diversifying into 
aerospace, defence and electronics.  Under its chairman, Edzard Reuter, it had built up 
a major aerospace division through its acquisition of MTU, Dornier, MBB and 
Fokker.  From being almost exclusively a builder of prestige cars and trucks, Daimler-
Benz rapidly evolved during the 1980s into an industrial conglomerate whose 
aerospace division formed the bulk of the German aerospace industry. Diversification 
into aerospace was also a feature of car producers in the Far East.  Japanese car 
manufacturers Mitsubishi and Nissan had major aerospace divisions.  Even in Korea 
firms new to car manufacturing like Hyundai and Daewoo had interests in aerospace.  
Against this background, BMW, was unusual.  Its strategy had been to focus on the 
automotive sector, rather than diversifying. 
 
By 1990 BMW had reached an awkward size (Allison and Barnes, 1993).  Its sales 
had grown steadily during the 1980s.  By 1990 it had a turnover of DM 27 billion and 
was producing half a million cars per year.  Although still substantially smaller than 
the full range producers, such as Fiat and Renault (table IV), it was large for a 
specialist manufacturer producing cars for a specific market niche.  Although pursuing 
its market niche on a global basis helped, it was in danger of becoming a victim of its 
own success.  Sales growth reduced the exclusivity sought by buyers in this market 
segment and associated with the BMW brand. 
 
Take in Table IV 
 
Consequently diversification into aerospace through a strategic alliance with Britain‟s 
Rolls-Royce had a number of attractions as a competitive strategy. Firstly, it was in 
line with the competitive strategies being pursued by competitors, many of whom had 
also diversified into aerospace. Secondly it was likely to reinforce rather than dilute 
the brand (Kay, 1993). Finally it had the appeal of enabling the company to return to 
its roots as an aero engine manufacturer. 
 
In meeting these ambitions, a strategic alliance with Rolls-Royce measured up well. 
When the first engines left the joint venture‟s engine plane at Dahlewitz, near Berlin 
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in 1996, BMW regained its status as an aerospace company. Aero engines, as high 
technology products complemented BMW‟s increasingly sophisticated range of cars. 
Although the joint venture had required a big investment to develop an entirely new 
engine, the technical performance of the engine was satisfactory  and overall sales 
were on target.  
 
Why then did BMW withdraw from the joint venture in 1999? The answer lies not in 
BMW‟s aero engine activities but rather in its car division. Four years after 
establishing the joint venture with Rolls-Royce, BMW announced much bolder plans 
when in 1994 it bought the British car manufacturer Rover. Despite early promise, this 
venture became mired in crisis when, as table V shows, Rover sales fell sharply in the 
first half of 1999. 
 
Take in Table V 
  
The drop in sales was attributed to the high value of the pound and changes in Rover‟s 
product range. The effect was a sharp decline in Rover‟s market share to 4.6 per cent.  
These troubles were widely reported in the press and led to the departure of BMW‟s 
chief executive Bernd Pischetsreider and his deputy Wolfgang Reitzle.  The company 
was forced to turn all its efforts to turning Rover around.  Under these circumstances, 
it was perhaps not surprising that BMW chose to focus its efforts on its core business 
and turn its investment in aero engines into a more liquid form. 
 
There were other factors beside this immediate short term crisis that led BMW to 
focus on its core business.  The car industry, especially the sector inhabited by BMW 
was very different at the end of the 1990s from what it had been at the start of the 
decade.  Whereas there had been five European firms in the specialist executive car 
market segment at the start of the decade, none remained as independent producers by 
the end of the decade.  Having taken over Rover, BMW doubled in size in output 
terms and moved into the volume car sector.  British owned Jaguar was bought by 
Ford of the US in 1990.  In the same year General Motors of the US bought a 50 per 
cent stake in Sweden‟s Saab exercising its option to buy the remainder in January 
2000.  In 1998 Daimler-Benz, manufacturers of Mercedes cars, merged with Chrysler 
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of the US and finally in 1999 Ford of the US bought Volvo‟s car division for $5 
billion.  In the course of a decade the executive car market segment was transformed.  
Independent specialist manufacturers of executive cars disappeared, unable to sustain 
the $1 billion costs associated with developing a new model.  Instead they became 
part of volume car manufacturers whose competitive strategy was to cease selling 
executive cars under a generic name, in favour of buying or building an executive car 
brand.  In the process they stood to benefit from economies of scope. 
 
BMW was at the centre of this strategic change.  It acquired a volume car business 
that included three major UK plants and it established manufacturing facilities in the 
US.  Faced with such dramatic strategic change, it chose to focus on its core business. 
 
In opting to focus, BMW was not alone.  A clear trend of the 1990s was a move away 
from diversification by the leading car makers.  In 1990 Ford sold its Ford Aerospace 
division to Loral which was in turn purchased by Lockheed-Martin in 1996.  General 
Motors of the US, sold its Allison aero engine division in 1993 and then in 1996 sold 
its Hughes Electronics division to Raytheon.  Similarly, US car maker Chrysler, sold 
its Gulfstream aerospace business in 1990, when „an anticipated synergism between 
the companies never materialised’ (Phillips, Phillips and Phillips, 1994, p225).  
Similarly in Europe, British Aerospace and Saab sold their car businesses in the early 
1990s in order to concentrate on aerospace.  The drive to focus was not driven by car 
makers failing to make a success of aerospace.  Ford Aerospace for instance, had been 
consistently profitable (Hayward, 1994).  However, the harsher environment for 
defence contractors that prevailed in the years after the ending of the Cold War, 
caused car makers like General Motors, Ford and Chrysler to re-evaluate their strategy 
and exit from the aerospace business. 
 
Hence, by the end of the 1990s the car industry environment, especially the executive 
car segment looked very different from a decade earlier.  When combined with 
BMW‟s problems with its Rover division and BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH‟s relatively 
slow progress in the rapidly developing regional jet market, it was perhaps inevitable 
that BMW should re-evaluate its involvement in the aero engine business. 
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In October 1999 BMW sold its share in BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH to its British 
partner and the enterprise was re-named Rolls-Royce Deutschland.   The move was a 
direct result of problems in BMW‟s car division rather than dissatisfaction over the 
company‟s decade long venture in aerospace. This was reflected in BMW‟s decision 
to increase its stake in Rolls-Royce from 2% to 10%, a move designed to demonstrate 
the company‟s confidence in the aerospace activities to which it had been party. 
 
Rolls-Royce plc 
 
By 1990 Rolls-Royce was one of only three aero engine manufacturers in the world 
with the capability to design, develop and manufacture a range of military and civil 
aero engines (Hayward, 1989).  It had only recently returned to the private sector 
having been floated in May 1987 as part of the Thatcher administration‟s privatisation 
programme. 
Take in Table VI 
 
After the financial disaster in the early 1970s, that had seen the company taken into 
public ownership and its car division sold to Vickers, it had made significant progress 
during the 1980s.  Not only had its sales risen steadily (table VI), but it had returned to 
profit.  A major factor had been a drive for improved productivity which had seen the 
company lose 26,000 jobs in six years (Hayward, 1989).  It had also reduced its 
dependence on its biggest customer, the UK government.  The proportion of civil 
engines that made up the company‟s output rose steadily (table VI).  Its share of the 
market for civil engines, which had averaged 13 per cent in the late 1970s and early 
1980s (Hayward, 1989), had risen to 20 per cent by 1990.  This reflected an increasing 
emphasis on commercialisation within the company. Thus by 1990 Rolls-Royce was 
much healthier than it had been a decade earlier. Not only was it back in profit but it 
had an order backlog of $5.7 billion. 
 
However, Rolls-Royce faced a number of weaknesses.  Although one of the Big Three 
engine manufacturers in the world, in terms of size as measured by turnover, which 
stood at $4.1 billion in 1990, it was almost half the size of its two American rivals, 
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General Electric with a turnover of $7.6 billion and Pratt and Whitney with a turnover 
of $7.3 billion.  
 
Not only was it in third place, the company was heavily committed to the 
development of two major new engine programmes.  The V2500 engine being 
developed as part of the International Aero Engines joint venture was about to enter 
service, but was not projected to break-even until 2001 (Birch, 1998).  The company 
had launched its biggest and most expensive engine, the Trent, two years earlier in 
1988 (Walters, 1999).  Not only was the Trent absorbing a great deal of money for 
research and development, it was several years away from entering service let alone 
contributing to profitability. 
 
Unlike its American counterparts, Rolls-Royce was not a diversified industrial group.  
It had begun to diversify having moved into power generation through the acquisition 
of Northern Engineering Industries in 1989, but was still heavily dependent on 
aerospace.  This made it vulnerable to the cyclical nature of the aerospace industry 
that led to strong fluctuations in sales.  This was normally mitigated by military sales 
which were more stable, but the ending of the Cold War brought this in to question. 
 
However Rolls-Royce‟s biggest weakness was the narrowness of its product range. In 
1980 the company was able to offer engines for just four civil aircraft applications 
(Rolls-Royce 1997, p8). This put Rolls-Royce at as serious disadvantage. Firstly, it 
meant that there were some market segments in which Rolls-Royce simply did not 
compete. This made the company vulnerable because a downturn in the segments 
where it was represented could not be offset against segments where demand 
remained healthy. Secondly since commercial airliner manufacturers operate across all 
market segments and plan their engine acquisition strategies in an integrated manner, 
they tend to favour suppliers with a full range product portfolio (Bonaccorsi and 
Giuri, 2000, p859). Thirdly, in the jet engine sector of the aero engine market, a 
failure to cover a broad range of market segments means that a manufacturer is unable 
to take advantage of the economies of scope which come from offering a range of 
engines that share  the same technology (Bonaccorsi and Giuri, 2000, p867). Rolls-
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Royce was loosing the potential increasing returns from R & D that it would have 
gained with a broader product range. 
 
Mindful of these weaknesses, Rolls-Royce in the 1980s defined a new competitive 
strategy that was to alter both the company and the way in which it did business. The 
company set the ambitious goal of a 30 per cent share of the worldwide civil turbofan 
market. In view of the company‟s modest share of the market at this time and the 
dominant position of Pratt and Whitney, this was a particularly ambitious goal. 
 
In order to meet its long term goal, Rolls-Royce‟s competitive strategy from the early 
1980s onwards was „to broaden its civil aero engine product range‟ (Pugh, 2001, 
p325). A broader product range not only increased the number of market segments in 
which the company could compete, it also provided scope for „making technology 
transferable between engines‟ (Pugh, 2001, p324).  
 
As part of this strategy Rolls-Royce developed a number of derivative engines. These 
utilized the core of an existing engine adapted, often using new technologies 
developed for other engines, to meet the needs of a new market segment. Examples of 
this derivative approach included the 535 engine which entered service in 1983, a de-
rated version of the larger RB-211 and the Tay which entered service in 1987, based 
on the core of the Spey engine of the early 1960s. While the derivative approach 
enabled Rolls-Royce to extend its product portfolio for a much reduced outlay 
compared to completely new engine designs, it had its limitation. Consequently in the 
late 1980s Rolls-Royce utilized another mechanism for extending its portfolio, namely 
strategic alliances. 
 
BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH was one such alliance. To judge by the progress that Rolls 
Royce made in achieving its long term goals, BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH may be 
judged very successful. By the end of 1999, when the joint venture was concluded, 
Rolls-Royce was in vastly better shape.  
 
The company‟s annual report for that year (Rolls-Royce, 2000, p3) noted that the 
company had achieved its long term goal of a 30 per cent share of all civil aero engine 
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orders for each of the last three years. The company‟s product portfolio was by this 
time much broader with company supplying engines for 30 different civil  airframe 
applications. A measure of the progress that had been made since the inception of 
BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH can be gauged from the fact that the increase in airframe 
applications  represented „a five-fold increase compared to the position at the start of 
the 1990s‟ (Rolls-Royce, 2000, p10). BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH was responsible for 
four of the additional airframe applications.  
 
Take in Table VII 
 
Improvements in market share were reflected in a big increase in engine production 
during the course of the 1990s. Table VII shows that over the course of the 1990s 
output of civil aero engines rose steadily. Output rose especially rapidly after 1996 
when the first BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH engines went into service. Although the 
growth in output was brought about by a number of factors, including the build up of 
Trent engine production and growth in small engine production, BMW Rolls-Royce 
GmbH was clearly an important contributor.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Given that the joint venture was terminated in November 1999, after almost a decade 
of existence, one might expect any evaluation of BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH  to 
conclude that it was not a success. If continuity and longevity are evaluation criteria 
then this would appear to be the case. However the fact that aero engines continue to 
be produced at the joint venture‟s premises at Dahlewitz near Berlin, suggests that 
such a judgement might be unwarranted. 
 
Evaluating a strategic alliance from a strategic management perspective is primarily a 
matter of determining the extent to which the collaboration achieved the long term 
objectives of the partners who set it up. In the case of BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH the 
objective was simple enough, The partners, BMW and Rolls-Royce, set out to produce 
a family of advanced turbofan engines, based on an entirely new engine core, that 
would compete in the 14,000-22,000lbs thrust segment of the market. 
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Though straightforward, this was an ambitious target for two reasons. Firstly, new 
engines, especially those that are new designs, take a very long time to develop. Many 
have taken nearly ten years to get them into full scale production. Over such a long 
time scale market conditions can change dramatically. Secondly, the market for the 
new engine was far from clear. None of the aircraft that the BR700 engine was 
intended for, was yet in service. The prospects for the regional airliner market 
especially were far from clear, with a number of aircraft proposed, but not actually 
launched as committed programmes. 
 
Against this background, BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH would appear to have performed 
remarkably well. The new engine core that formed the basis of both the BR700 
engines was a technical success. Unlike many engine programmes, especially those 
that are new rather than derivative designs (Gunston, 1989), both BR700 engines 
encountered few technical problems and exceeded their performance targets in 
service. Similarly sales were encouraging and are currently on target to meet the long 
term level of sales projected for 2010. 
 
One aspect of the strategic alliance‟s performance qualifies the picture of strong 
performance. The larger of the two engines, the BR715, has not sold as well as 
planned. This is largely because the regional jet market has not developed as predicted 
back in 1990. While there has been a „rush for jets‟, growth has occurred in the 50 and 
70 seat sectors, with demand for the larger 100 seat regional jets remaining sluggish. 
 
As for the partners who created the strategic alliance, the picture is mixed. The fact 
that BMW pulled out in 1999strongly suggests that the joint venture did not measure 
up to the German car makers‟s expectations. However as this study has shown, such a 
conclusion would be premature. For one thing BMW has retained a financial interest, 
albeit through its stake in Rolls-Royce rather than the joint venture itself. More 
significantly, changes in the automotive industry over the course of the 1990s, 
especially those associated with the competitive strategies of most of the leading car 
makers, have meant that BMW has chosen to focus on its automotive interests. 
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As for Rolls-Royce, it has clearly benefited greatly from the collaboration. It now has 
a much broader product portfolio than a decade ago. The company has achieved its 
long term goal of a one third share of the commercial jet engine market and it has 
overtaken its long time rival Pratt and Whitney, moving up into second place among 
the world‟s leading aero engine producers. The alliance with BMW played an 
important part in the company‟s improved performance. 
 
Thus from both the perspective of the partners and the joint venture itself, an 
evaluation of BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH really has to conclude that it performed well 
and was remarkably successful over the decade or so of its existence. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table I 
Turnover of European Aero Engine Manufacturers 1990-9 
Rank Organisation Country Turnover ($m) 
   1990 1999 
1. Rolls-Royce plc UK 4,153 6,107 
2. SNECMA* France 2,969 3,962 
3. MTU Germany 2,229 1,853 
4. Fiat Avio* Italy 1,328 1,517 
5. Volvo Flygmotor* Sweden 402 1,801 
6. BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH Germany/UK n/a 727 
7. Turbomeca France 544 534 
* also manufacture non-engine sub-systems and components 
Source: Flight International (1992); Flight International (2000a). 
 
Table II 
 
Growth of BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH 1993-99 
 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Turnover ($million) 73 68 73 144 339 452 727 
Investment ($million) 103 148 108 195 61 72 n/a 
Employees 1,200 1,450 1,800 1,957  2,065 2,066 n/a 
  
Source: BMW (1998); BMW (1999). 
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Table III 
Orders/Deliveries for the Boeing 717/MD-95 
 
Airline Delivered On Order Total 
Aerolineas Baleares 4 0 4 
AirTran Airways 22 28 50 
Bangkok Airways 2 0 2 
Bavaria Leasing (5) 0 (5) 
Hawaiian Airlines 4 9 13 
Impulse Airlines 8 0 8 
Olympic Aviation 3 0 3 
Pembroke Capital (6) 21 21 
Turkmenistan Airlines 0 3 3 
TWA 20 30 50 
 63 91 154 
Source: Norris, Kingsley-Jones and Doyle (2001) 
 
Table IV 
European Car Market in 1990 
 
 Manufacturer Output 
(000s) 
% 
1. VW 2,031 15.4 
2. Fiat 1,874 14.2 
3. PSA 1,708 12.9 
4. General Motors 1,554 11.8 
5. Ford 1,529 11.6 
6. Renault 1,295   9.8 
7. Daimler-Benz    431   3.3 
8. Rover    390   2.9 
9. Nissan    381   2.9 
10. BMW    362   2.7 
 
Source: Very, Berthelier and Calori (1993) 
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Table V 
 
Output of BMW Group 1998-99 
 
Date January-June 1999 January-June 1998 Change 
Cars 562,952 630,491 - 10.7% 
BMW 381,689 350,596 +  8.9% 
Rover 87,459 173,376 - 49.6% 
Land Rover 83,511 89,813 -  7.0% 
Mini 5,093 8,692 - 41.4% 
MG 5,201 8,104 - 35.1% 
Motorcycles 42,660 36,138 +18.0% 
Aero engines 71 51 +39.2% 
    
 
Source: BMW (1999). 
 
Table VI 
Rolls-Royce Distribution of Turnover 1982-87 
 
Year Civil Military Other  Total 
1982 520 742 231 1,493 
1983 388 706 137 1,331 
1984 446 735 228 1,409 
1985 577 735 289 1,601 
1986 757 740 305 1,802 
1987 943 820 286 2,059 
 
Source: Hayward (1989) 
 
Table VII 
 
Rolls-Royce Annual Civil Aero Engine Output 1994-99 
Year Output 
1994 407 
1995 405 
1996 424 
1997 625 
1998 911 
1999 1089 
Source: Rolls-Royce (2000). 
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Figure 1 
 
Output of Civil Aero Engine IJVs 1984-1999
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Source: European Commission (1997); GAMA (2001) 
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Figure 2 
 
Regional Airliner Market  1991-2001 
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Source: Kingsley-Jones (2001a);   
